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Over the last decade there has been increasing international pressure on countries to raise social stan-
dards (i.e., production standards based on environmental and labor conditions). Currently, the World
Trade Organization does not allow countries to impose minimum standards on imports based on envi-
ronmental or labor standards because it is assumed to undermine competition. There is no consensus
in the empirical literature, however, to support this claim. In fact, the evidence suggests that while
stronger environmental standards hurt competitiveness, stronger labor standards do the opposite. This
paper offers one possible explanation for this paradox. In a simple model of incomplete information,
externally-imposed standards may either increase or decrease the competitiveness of infant ﬁrms from
developing countries depending on the degree of complementarity between the standard and the pro-
duction of high-quality goods.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
One popular argument against the establishment of international “social standards” (i.e., 
production standards based on labor or environmental concerns) is that it will harm developing 
countries.  Forcing developing countries to adhere to the higher production standards of their 
wealthier trading partners is assumed to hurt the competitiveness of its firms and reduce its 
exports.  This is an especially powerful argument since developing countries are typically 
endowed with infant firms attempting to gain a foothold in established world markets.  Without 
the benefit of an international reputation, infant firms must have lower costs in order to induce 
consumers to experience their product for the first time.       
This is one of the reasons why the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been reticent to 
allow countries to impose trade barriers on the basis of lax social standards.
1  The WTO refers to 
these “low standards” as non-conforming processes and production methods (PPMs).  While 
WTO rules allow countries to regulate observable product quality (ISO 9000 standards), 
standards based on PPMs have generally been viewed with suspicion.
2  Their reasoning is based 
on the fact that PPM standards are not directly related to product quality.  As a result, social 
standards, like those related to labor and the environment, are assumed to harm foreign 
competition. 
Empirical research, however, does not unanimously support this logic.  In their extensive 
review of the literature on trade and the environment, Copeland and Taylor (2004) conclude that 
the bulk of existing empirical studies support the claim that tighter environmental standards hurt 
competitiveness.  However, studies of the effect of labor standards on trade do not reach the 
same conclusion.  Van Beers (1988) finds no evidence that adherence to higher labor standards 
leads to a decrease in exports of labor-intensive goods.  Even more recent evidence shows that   2 
countries with higher labor standards actually appear to have an export advantage.
3  Kucera and 
Sarna (2006) find a robust, positive relationship between stronger labor rights associated with 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (FACB) and total manufacturing exports.   
Herein lays the paradox:  studies of the effects of environmental standards on exports 
generally find a negative relationship while recent studies on the effects of labor standards on 
exports find evidence of either no relationship or a strong positive one.   
Though a literature exists on the general issue of social standards and export 
competitiveness, none of the existing models can explain these contradictory empirical findings.  
In general, models assuming perfect competition and complete information predict that higher 
standards will hurt competitiveness.
4  However, if the market is imperfectly competitive, then 
higher standards in one country can actually aid the competitiveness of domestic firms.  
However, such models cannot explain why environmental standards and labor standards might 
have different effects on export competitiveness.  More recently, Rege (2000) analyzes a related 
issue in the context of incomplete information.  Rege considers a very special case in which 
consumers have a strong preference for goods produced with environmentally-friendly 
processes.  Not surprisingly, under this assumption higher social standards help exports by 
providing firms a more reliable signal.  But Rege‟s model does not satisfactorily explain the 
empirical differences on the effects of labor and environmental standards either.  If consumers 
really have such strong preferences for socially-responsible goods in general, both environmental 
and labor standards should enhance a country‟s export competitiveness.   
As we see, the existing theoretical literature offers little insight into this empirical 
paradox.  The purpose of this paper is to offer a theoretical explanation capable of reconciling 
the paradoxical results obtained in the empirical literature.  As we show, the key to reconciling   3 
the empirical results lies in the nature of the markets themselves and the PPM standards 
proposed.  While the effect of process standards on vertically-differentiated product markets in 
the presence of incomplete information has been studied in the industrial organization literature,
5 
it has yet to be applied to models of international trade.  The most relevant paper for the present 
context is Shapiro‟s (1986) analysis of the relative effects of process (input) standards on 
markets vertically differentiated by quality.  Following his logic, the marginal cost of compliance 
is assumed to be higher for low-quality producers than for high-quality producers.  Ultimately, 
this assumption leads directly to theoretical predictions that are capable of explaining the 
empirical paradox surrounding the effects of social standards on export competitiveness.  
 
 
2.  THE MODEL  
One of the most controversial subjects of debate in international trade concerns the 
effects of minimum PPM standards on non-conforming exports from LDCs.   For example, 
recent bilateral trade negotiations between the USA and Peru and Panama have included the 
imposition of minimum labor standards for all exported goods to the USA. Like earlier pacts 
with countries like Cambodia and Jordan, many believe such PPM requirements will diminish 
the competitiveness of exports from these LDCs to the USA.  To investigate such claims, we 
restrict our analysis to understanding the effect of externally-imposed PPM standards on the 
competitiveness of infant firms from LDCs that wish to export to perfectly competitive foreign 
markets.  Though a number of closely-related models exist, the setup in this paper is based on 
Grossman and Horn‟s (1988) seminal model of incomplete information and infant industries.
6   
Assume a world consisting of two countries, North and South, where each produces a 
vertically-differentiated “experience good.”  An experience good is one in which consumers only   4 
learn about its quality when it is consumed for the first time.  The North (the developed country) 
is endowed with a set of perfectly competitive incumbent firms, while the South (the less-
developed country) is endowed with a set of new entrants.  Given the recent and dramatic rise in 
the share of LDC exports in experience goods, this is a realistic assumption.
7      
Each country manufactures a vertically-differentiated experience good whose exact 
quality can be ascertained only after consumption.  So, while the quality of the goods produced 
by the incumbent Northern firms is known by Northern consumers based on past consumption 
experiences, the quality of the new entrant firms from the South is unknown in the initial period.
8  
It is assumed that all consumers of the experience good are located in the North.  This 
assumption allows us to analyze the problem from the point of view of the export-oriented 
developing country attempting to compete in an established perfectly competitive world market.  
  The model consists of two periods. Southern firms are new entrants into a perfectly 
competitive market consisting of a large number of Northern firms with established reputations.  
Because of this, Northern consumers have full information about the quality of goods from the 
North, but incomplete information about the quality of goods produced by Southern firms in the 
first period (infancy).  Only in the second period (maturity) do consumers know the quality of 
goods from the South.  Prior to the first period, the North chooses to impose a PPM standard (r) 
on all imports from the South.
9  Southern firms then decide whether to produce and what level of 
quality to choose.  They make this choice given their firm-specific exogenous efficiency 
parameter ( ) and the costs of complying with international process standards (r).   
  Of course, the production of the experience good in the South generates a negative 
externality on a quasi-public “social good” in that country.  This could be the pollution generated 
from production that damages the environment or the child labor used in production that reduces   5 
the country‟s literacy levels.  If the South values this social good (public education or the 
environment), damage due to the negative externality would require domestic regulation to 
maximize net social welfare.  Optimally, this should be done such that the marginal cost of 
abatement is equal to the marginal social benefit of abatement.  However, for the purposes of this 
paper, the South, perhaps due to their lack of economic development, is assumed to place no 
value on the externality produced by the social good.  As a result, the government of the South is 
assumed to be maximizing net social welfare by not regulating or taxing domestic production. 
This assumption is clearly not an accurate representation of policy in LDCs, but a 
simplifying assumption.
10  Most importantly, though, this simplification is consistent with the 
central question of the paper.  This assumption ensures that the imposition of any PPMs  by the 
North on production in the South is not socially optimal from the South‟s point of view.  In other 
words, the PPMs imposed by the North are not correcting an inefficiency that the South has not 
addressed.  These PPMs can be thought of as exogenously-imposed “over-regulation” of 
Southern production.  Again, this is the implicit assumption made by those who argue that 
forcing the South to adhere to the higher PPM standards of the North will necessarily harm the 
South.  For example, the imposition of the proposed minimum labor standards by the USA on 
Peru and Panama are not meant to correct a market failure in those countries.   
 
2.1. Southern Infant Firms 
Each firm produces one unit of an experience good each period they produce.  This 
experience good is differentiated by quality (q), where firms producing higher quality goods 
naturally incur higher marginal costs than low-quality producers for a given level of .   Firms 
are indexed by  , where   represents the exogenous efficiency parameter for each firm,   6 
determined by firm-specific characteristics, such as R&D, that take place prior to the first period. 
The cumulative density function of  's among the set of potential entrants is denoted by ) ( F , 
and the marginal density function  ) ( f  is constrained by  ) ( f > 0 over the range [
max min,  ].
11  
Each firm has production costs of  ) (q c   per period, where q represents the quality of the good 
produced and 0 ,     c c .   
Since   is assumed to lower the cost of production, variations in across firms determine 
a firm‟s propensity to produce a given level of quality.  Since the marginal cost of quality is 
increasing, only the more productive firms (firms with an exogenously low ) will find it profit-
maximizing to produce higher quality goods.  In period one, each firm makes a once-and-for-all 
decision to produce at quality level q to maximize profits over both periods.
12  A firm of type 
chooses quality, ) ( q . Note here that there exists an international minimum product quality 
standard, q0, below which any quality is directly observable before purchase.
13   Since any 
quality less than the mandated minimum is directly observable by consumers prior to experience, 
Northern consumers will never buy a good of quality less than q0.  Furthermore, given that firms 
choosing to produce low-quality goods will not survive into the second period, they have no 
incentive to produce any quality above the minimum quality (q0).  These one-period producers 
are referred to as “fly-by-nights.”  Alternatively, if a firm finds it in their best interest to invest in 
quality (and earn profits in the second period), they choose the quality 0 ) ( ˆ q q q     that 
maximizes their two-period profits.  Unlike fly-by-nights, these “reputable” firms are willing to 
invest in the costly infrastructure required to remain competitive over a long period of time.  Fly-
by-nights, by their nature, will not take on such investments since they will not survive infancy 
to recoup such costs.  In general, we will denote the quality of goods produced by reputable 
firms as q
R while the fly-by-night firms produce q0.
14    7 
 
2.2 International Standards 
In addition to the costs of production ( ) (q c  ), Southern firms incur an exogenously 
imposed compliance cost (r) associated with a PPM standard imposed by the North.  But unlike 
taxes, compliance costs are not constant across all Southern firms.  The key assumption here is 
that the marginal cost of compliance is related to the firm‟s choice of output quality.  In fact, the 
assumption of such a relationship is not unique.  Building on Akerloff‟s (1970) seminal work on 
adverse selection and moral hazard in models with asymmetric information, Shapiro (1986) 
analyzed the effects of input standards on the production of quality goods.  Using the example of 
occupational licensing as his input standard, he argued that even if the standard has no direct 
relationship to product quality, it can affect production decisions indirectly since the marginal 
cost of meeting standards differs across producers.  Specifically, Shapiro argued that the 
marginal cost of meeting process standards is higher for producers of low quality than for high 
quality.  The primary reason for this is that low quality producers will only survive one period 
regardless of whether they meet the standard.  Unlike high-quality producers, their compliance 
costs cannot be spread over two periods.  High quality producers, on the other hand, incur the 
costs associated with investment in their human capital regardless of whether it is regulated by 
the government.  As such, the cost of compliance falls relatively heavily on producers of low 
quality.   
The recent example of Cambodia helps to illustrate the case. In 1999 the United States 
and Cambodia signed a bilateral trade agreement that essentially forced Cambodia to allow the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) to certify working conditions in its factories.  
Cambodia‟s garment makers had to pay significant fees to set up ILO monitors.  As   8 
manufacturing costs increased, many potential new factories chose to set up in Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Bangladesh.  Since these countries were not forced to meet the ILO standards, their 
production costs remained below that of Cambodia (Prasso 2004).  Logic would lead us to 
deduce that the firms that chose to avoid Cambodia were those with low levels of efficiency and 
high compliance costs.  But not all firms avoided the high standards.  High quality 
manufacturers, the ones more likely to find it in their long-term interest to maintain favorable 
working conditions, were better prepared for compliance.  Unlike their fly-by-night counterparts, 
these producers were not hurt by new standards.  If fact, since 1999 Cambodia‟s garment exports 
have more than tripled and their international reputation has significantly improved (Prasso 
2004).   
Following Shapiro‟s (1986) reasoning, it is assumed that the imposition of PPM 
standards imposes a relatively smaller marginal cost for reputable firms than for fly-by-nights.  
The cost of compliance for each firm producing a given level of quality is given by r q) (  .  In 
general, as the quality level chosen by firms increases, the cost of compliance with the PPM 
standard ( r q) (  ) decreases at a decreasing rate ( 0 , 0        ).  Furthermore, assume there is a 
range of standards of type j where 1 ) ( 0   q j  .   Again, following Shapiro (1986),  ) (q j   is 
assumed to vary with the degree of complementarity between the process standard rj and the 
product quality q.  For example, if a high quality producer meets the standard regardless of 
whether it is legally required, then  0 ) ( 
R q  .  On the other hand, if the standard in question is 
not met even partially by any firm prior to regulation, then 1 ) ( ) ( 0   q q
R   .  In this extreme 
case, all firms regardless of quality would face the maximum compliance costs of r. In general, 
however, we can imagine some standards exist in which high quality firms at least partially meet 
even prior to external mandates.   9 
Thus, it appears reasonable to imagine a set of standards which high quality firms choose 
to meet prior to regulation.  In other words, the production of high-quality goods and the 
acceptance of high social standards are complements.  Thus, when external minimum standards 
are imposed, the cost of compliance for high quality firms is less than that for low quality 
producers.  This implies that for such standards ) ( ) ( 0 q q
R    .   
 
2.3. Northern Consumers  
Northern consumers are assumed to value only the objective quality of the experience 
good.  They do not value the social quality of production.  This assumption is fundamentally 
different than that which has been used in some of the recent environmental literature (Rege 
2000, Conrad 2005).  Only by making this assumption can the effects of social regulation (non-
quality related PPMs) be distinguished from quality-related standards (e.g., ISO 9000 standards) 
that directly affect consumer demand.
15  Since the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether 
being forced to meet exogenous PPM standards hurts the competitiveness of Southern firms, this 
distinction is critical.  Moreover, it is arguably more realistic compared to previous research.  
Assume that Northern consumers value product quality at the rate of , and demand one 
unit of output ( ) q(θ ) per period.  Recall that in the first period Northern consumers have no 
information about the true quality of the Southern (infant) good, but do have full information 
about goods produced by the incumbent firms from the North.  Suppose that Northern consumers 
obtain a surplus equal to U* by consuming their established domestic goods.  Thus in the 
absence of barriers to trade, these consumers will only buy goods produced by the infant 
Southern firms if the expected introductory price/quality combination offers them at least U* in 
surplus.  The first-period price depends on consumer expectations about the quality
e q .
16  In the   10 
presence of incomplete information and a large number of competitive rivals in the world, infant 
firms from the South are forced to behave as price takers in the introductory period, even though 
they produce differentiated products.  Thus in the first-period all Southern firms (fly by nights as 
well as reputable) get the same price which is given by 
(1) 
* U γq p
e   . 
    In the second period consumers have complete information about the true quality of each 
firm.  Thus, while reputable Southern firms are able to charge higher prices for higher quality 
goods, the fly-by-night producers are unable to survive.  With no barriers to trade, the second-
period equilibrium prices are given by  
(2) 
* ) ( U q z     , 
where z is the price of the good made by a firm of type .  
 
2.4. Equilibrium 
Having defined equilibrium prices, the Southern firm‟s problem can be solved.  At the 
beginning of period one, each firm of type  must decide (1) whether to enter the world market 
and (2) what level of quality to produce.  If a firm produces their total costs are λ(q)r c(q) θ  .  
Since the international market is perfectly competitive, new entrants are price takers in the first 
period, and thus in period one each Southern firm will earn profits given by 
(3)  r q q c θ p ) ( ) ( ) ( 1       . 
If the firm chooses a reputable strategy, it will earn the following second-period profits  
(4)  λ(q)r c(q) θ z
R    ) (θ Π
R
2 . 
The discounted two-period profit function for reputable firms is given by   11 
(5)   ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1
R R R          , 
where   is the discount factor ( <1) .   
  Each reputable firm chooses quality to maximize equation 5 given .  Thus, for a 
reputable firm, the first-order condition implies  
(6)    r q q c ) ( ) ( ) 1 (          ,  
where  0 ) ( , 0 ) (     r q q c   .  Note that to ensure equilibrium it is necessary to restrict our 
analysis to cases such that r q q c ) ( ) (      .  Using equations 3-6, the discounted profits for a 





                   r q q c U q r q q c p
R R R R ) ˆ ( )) ( ˆ ( * ) ( ˆ ) ˆ ( )) ( ˆ ( ) ( 2  
where  ) ( ˆ  q is the level of quality that solves equation 6 for a reputable firm.  This is the profit-
maximizing quality for a firm of type  .   
  Since firms that choose a fly-by-night strategy only survive one period, fly-by-nights 
maximize one-period profits (equation 3) by producing the minimum non-observable quality, q0.  
Thus the profit function for a fly-by-night firm is given by  
(8)  r q q c p
F F F ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 0 1        . 
Figure 1 shows the envelope of the profit functions for each type of firm where both 
profit functions are decreasing with   ( 0 / 2     
R and 0 / 1     
F ).  Furthermore, the 
incentive to establish a high reputation is found to be decreasing with .  That is, 
0 ) ( ) ˆ ( ) 1 (
) (
0
1 2     

   




.  This means that firms with low  values are the ones 
that have a propensity to produce high quality and this propensity declines with increases in . 
Note that  represents previous levels of R&D and investment that each firm is predisposed to   12 
when deciding which quality level to choose. Therefore, at low levels of the profit envelope 
of high-quality producers is always steeper and above the profit envelope of low-quality 
producers.  
Figure 1: Equilibrium  
 
At the margin, a firm with efficiency parameter 
R   is indifferent between choosing to 
produce either high or low quality.  At the margin, then it must be true that  ) ( ) (
R R R F       
(see Figure 1).  Using equations 7 and 8, this implies 
(9)      ) λ(q ) q δ)λ( ( r ) U q δ(γ ) c(q (θ q c( δ) ( θ
* R
0 0 ˆ 1 ˆ ) ˆ 1        . 
Furthermore, since fly-by-night firms survive only one period and there are no barriers to entry, 
the marginal fly-by-night must make zero profits ( ) (
F F   =0).  From equation 8 this implies 
(10)  )r λ(q ) c(q θ p
F
0 0   . 
F 
R 
R F   
F 




~  13 
  Solving equations 9 and 10 for 
R  and
F  respectively generates values for the quantity of 
each type of Southern firm in equilibrium. As shown in Figure 1, the high-quality (most 
efficient) producers operate in the range [
R   ,
min ] while low quality producers exist in the range 
[
F R   , ].  This equilibrium highlights the basic problem of moral hazard.  Firms endowed with 
] θ , [θ θ
R ~
  possess the efficiency necessary to earn a profit by producing high quality. However, 
because of the information asymmetries facing new entrants, they find it more profitable to 
produce low quality goods for one period and exit in period two.  In other words, even though 
such firms have the capabilities to survive into the second period and be competitive 
internationally, they choose instead to pursue a fly-by-night strategy.
17   
 
3.  COMPETITIVENESS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS  
With the model now defined, the effect of internationally-imposed PPM standards on the 
competitiveness of the Southern infant firms can be analyzed.  Competitiveness in the context of 
this model includes both the number of firms choosing to produce quality goods and, therefore, 
the average quality of the goods exported by the South.  Since only high quality producers can 
survive in the long run, ultimately the overall quality of exports from infant firms in the South is 
what determines whether the South can compete in the world market under free trade.  
 
Proposition:  The imposition of exogenous production standards will increase the 
competitiveness of Southern firms when the complementarity between the standard and the 
production of quality goods is relatively large but decrease competitiveness when the 
complementarity is small.  
 
Proof: 
  When Northern consumers have rational expectations they calculate the average 
quality of Southern goods and expect to receive this quality on average when they import   14 
from the South.  Thus, the average quality of goods produced by the South in period one 
can be written as 





















F F  is the cumulative distribution of all Southern firms and ) (
R F   is the 
cumulative distribution of the firms producing high quality (see Figure 1).  From equation 






























F ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) (
1
0 0 . 
  Given that  0 q q
R  and  q q  0 , the sign of equation 12 depends on the signs of  
r θ
R    and  r θ
F   .  These partial derivatives represent how the number of reputable 
and fly-by-night firms, respectively, changes in response to the new PPM standard.  
Solving equations 9 and 10 for   (under the condition that  ) ( ) (
R F R R      and
0 ) (  
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 and  0 /    r q . 
QED 
 
  As equation 13 shows, fly-by-night firms are unambiguously hurt when they are forced to 
meet the costs of higher standards.  Their profits decline and many are driven out of business (the   15 
envelope function 
F  shifts leftward in Figure 2).   Contrary to the effect on fly-by-nights, the 
effect on the number of reputable firms (equation 14) is ambiguous.  The sign depends on ) ˆ (q  , 
which is determined by the complementarity between the production of high quality goods and 
the standard imposed. 
Within the range of standards where  ) ˆ (q   is significantly small, the number of reputable 






).  In 
other words, if the PPM standard imposes a relatively smaller cost of compliance on high-quality 
firms ( ) ˆ (q  ) relative to fly-by-nights ( ) ( 0 q  ), then the number of firms choosing to produce 
goods of high quality will increase.     
Though counterintuitive at first, while profits decrease for high quality firms, more infant 
firms actually choose to produce higher quality goods.  There is a relatively large decrease in 
profits if they pursue a fly-by-night strategy, but only a small decrease in profits if they choose to 
produce high quality products.  This is shown in Figure 2 as a relatively small leftward shift of 
R   and a larger leftward shift of  
F  .  The key is that imposition of the PPM standard changes 
the behavior of the firms at the margin that have been endowed with ample efficiency to produce 
high quality goods (firms in the range  ] θ , [θ θ
R ~
 in Figure 1).  Now that all firms are forced to 
adhere to more stringent standards in period one, these firms endowed with  ] θ , [θ θ
R ~
 have less 
incentive to pursue a fly-by-night strategy; it is now more profitable to produce high quality 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium when the Cost of Compliance for Reputable Firms is Small 
 
Under these conditions, the competitiveness of the South will improve in the long run 
since the number of firms choosing to produce high quality goods increases in the initial period.  
This also insures that equation 12 will be positive ( 0 /    r q ).  Since the number of firms 
producing high-quality goods has increased relative to the fly-by-nights, the average quality of 
goods produced by the South is unambiguously positive. 
Increases in average quality will also have a permanent effect on a country‟s 
competitiveness.  Chisik (2002, 2003) shows that when consumers have incomplete information 
about product quality, reputational comparative advantage can be more important in determining 
the pattern of trade than advantages relating to production costs.  In addition, Das and DeLoach 
(2003) show that since consumers are likely to make inferences about the expected quality of 
new products based on past experience with related goods from the same country, positive 




















r   17 
strategy during infancy.  This can also lead to improved competitiveness for firms in related 
industries from that same country.  These reputation effects are likely to be even more important 
for less-developed countries.     
 
4.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The model generates predictions consistent with recent empirical work on the effect of social 
standards on export competitiveness.  But it also offers an important policy recommendation:  
some internationally-imposed PPM standards can actually improve the competitiveness of less-
developed countries as they attempt to enter world markets.   Contrary to the prevailing view of 
the WTO, compliance with PPM standards can increase the number of high-quality firms 
entering the market, ultimately increasing the average quality of goods exported from less-
developed countries.  But this result only holds under the conditions generated in equation 14.  
The key is the degree of complementarity between the proposed PPM standard and process 
determining high-quality production.  To illustrate this point, consider the following examples of 
PPMs that are often discussed in the literature.  
  A typical environmental standard that falls into the category of PPMs involves mandatory 
scrubber systems to control air pollution.  When such a standard is imposed, firms must make 
significant investments in pollution-abatement infrastructure.  But such systems control only the 
by-product of production.  As a result, regardless of the quality of the good being produced, it is 
difficult to imagine that these infrastructure costs would be any different for high-quality 
producers versus their low-quality counterparts.  So, if the costs are identical the number of firms 
of both quality type decreases. As a result, it is likely this type of PPM standard would diminish 
the competitiveness of firms from LDCs in the long run. This is consistent with the bulk of   18 
empirical evidence that finds a negative relationship between higher environmental standards 
and exports.   
  In contrast, the logic differs when we turn to labor standards.  Consider the relative skill 
level of the labor inputs required to produce quality.  The greater the skill of labor required for 
production, the more likely it is that high quality producers will pay efficiency wages, offer more 
benefits, better working conditions, etc.  In such cases, meeting stringent international labor 
standards would impose a relatively small cost on high-quality firms, but a relative large cost on 
fly by nights.  For example, consider the differences between electronics and textiles.  Many 
electronics require relatively highly-skilled workers.  Most textiles do not.  If a PPM standard 
mandating “livable wages” for workers was imposed, countries heavily endowed with textiles 
would more likely be hurt while countries heavily dependent on electronics might be helped.  
This prediction is consistent with the recent evidence showing that higher labor standards are 
positively related to manufacturing exports. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION  
The empirical literature concerning the effects of environmental and labor standards on export 
competitiveness yields mixed results.  While evidence suggests that higher environmental 
standards hurt exports, there is also some evidence that higher labor standards may increase 
exports.  For the first time, this paper offers a simple theoretical model of trade that is capable of 
explaining this paradox.   
  Of course, it is important to understand the conditions that generate the model‟s 
predictions.  The model is restricted to situations where firms are new entrants into an 
established international market and face a reputational comparative disadvantage due to the lack   19 
of information of their product quality.  This is more likely to hold for developing countries than 
for developed ones.  Ultimately, the effect of social standards on the competitiveness of these 
countries depends on the degree of complementarity between high quality production and the 
proposed standard.  Among other factors, this complementarity depends on both the type of PPM 
and the industry to which it is imposed. 
  These results offer an important challenge to popular thinking about the effects of social 
standards on trade, particularly with respect to ongoing North-South debates.  The WTO‟s 
rationale against the imposition of international production standards related to social concerns is 
based on its effect on competition.  They assume a country‟s exports will be less competitive if 
forced to adhere to more stringent standards imposed by another.  This paper shows this logic to 
be overly simplistic.  Rather than outlawing all PPM standards, the WTO should distinguish 
between standards that complement product quality versus those that do not.       
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Notes 
                                                 
1  This is not to say that the WTO does not support fundamental labor standards.  In fact, the 
WTO confirmed its support for international labor standards at the Singapore ministerial 
conference of 1996 (Doumbia-Henry and Gravel 2006).  Their position is that the establishment 
and enforcement of such standards is the role of the ILO.  Nevertheless, the issue regarding the 
extent to which standards based on PPMs unduly harms competition is still controversial.  
 
2 Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, member countries are prohibited 
from enacting standards with respect to PPMs that discriminate against exports from another 
country in favor of “like products” from either domestic sources or exports of a third country.  
Such restrictions are also covered under the Technical Barriers to Trade agreement (Beaulieu and 
Gaisford 2002).  While exceptions may exist (e.g., Article XX of the GATT), it is clear that it is 
the intent of the WTO to prohibit disguised protectionism.   
 
3 The literature on labor standards and exports is sparse because of the difficulty in measuring 
standards.  Until recently, most studies were forced to use ratifications of ILO conventions as a 
proxy for adherence to labor standards.  This measure has obvious flaws since it does not 
measure enforcement.  Only recently has there been an attempt to measure enforcement (see 
Kucera and Sarna 2006). 
 
4 Ulph (1999) for an overview of this literature. 
 
5 See Leland (1979), Shapiro (1983), Shapiro (1986), and Ronnen (1991). 
 
6 For other models that rely on a similar framework, see Mayer (1984), Bagwell and Staiger 
(1989), Bagwell (1991), Chen (1991), Skeath (1995), Chisik (2003) and Das and DeLoach 
(2003). 
 
7  For example, US imports from Asian and Pacific countries (excluding Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand) are now dominated by goods such as beverages, manufactures, apparel, cosmetics 
and pharmaceuticals.  Using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce (2008), we estimate 
that between 1990 and 2005 alone, the share of all Asian exports to the US that are experience 
goods has risen from 38% to 58%.   
 
8  For tractability of the model, we have eliminated the possibility that Northern firms can 
outsource production of their name-brand goods to the South.  Implicitly, our model assumes 
such activities do not eliminate the problem faced by infant firms in the South.  This is not 
entirely unreasonable.  Quality and reputation are clearly valued even in the production of 
outsourced goods.  In such cases, the “consumer” in the North is actually the Northern firm that 
imports the goods and resells them under their own brand name.  Consequently, consistent with 
the assumptions of the present model, fly-by-night firms from the South will not be able to meet 
the quality demanded by Northern brand name retailers in the long run.         
      
9 There could be a number of possible reasons for this.  It could simply be an effort to protect its 
industries from Southern competition.  Or, it could be a welfare-maximizing decision.  For 
example, if consumption of the good produces a transboundary negative externality (e.g.   23 
                                                                                                                                                             
pollution), it would be welfare-improving to impose some sort of regulation on imports from the 
South. 
 
10 Obviously LDCs value social standards.  For example, India has worked for years to eliminate 
child labor.  PROGRESA (now called Oportunidades) is a major program of the Mexican 
government aimed reducing problems like malnutrition, morbidity, school dropout rates and 
unhealthy living conditions.  Moreover, it is clearly not the case that all labor and environmental 
standards are imposed by developed countries.  Nevertheless, it is true that many developed 
countries want to impose even tougher standards on their less-developed counterparts.  That 
alone justifies the strong assumption maintained in this model.    
 
11 This allows for moral hazard in the firm's choice of quality, while the heterogeneity across 
firms in the cost of providing quality effectively introduces adverse selection. 
 
12 This assumption is consistent with the Grossman and Horn (1988) setup.  This assumption 
rules out the possibility of moral hazard in the second period of the model.  In a finite period 
model, all agents face a moral hazard problem.  In this model, without this assumption all 
reputable firms that survived the first period would clearly „cheat” and produce low-quality 
goods once they have established their reputation for quality.   
 
13 This is analogous to ISO 9000 quality standards, whereby any firms that do not adhere to this 
minimum standard cannot engage in international trade.   
 
14 We have ruled out performance uncertainty and quality randomness in production.   
15 For example, firms that fail to meet ISO 9000 standards would obviously have difficulty 
competing with firms that do meet these minimum quality standards.  But firms that fail to meet 
PPM standards could well have an advantage since their costs are lower. 
 
16 Following Grossman and Horn (1988), Chen (1991) and Skeath (1995) we assume that 
consumers have rational expectations of quality. This rules out arbitrary pessimistic expectations 
that would eliminate low quality producers in the first period.    
 
17 From the point of view of a policy maker in the South, this is inefficient.  The best policy, of 
course, would be to find a way to provide international consumers with perfect information about 
the quality of goods produced from this country.  Barring that, policy makers would prefer to 
find a way to provide incentives to productive firms to choose high quality and limit entry of 
those less productive, low quality firms.  However, the Southern policy makers do not have the 
necessary information to do this.  Historically, indiscriminate protection of all infant industries 
has not been successful without the ability to reward the high quality producers and punish the 
low quality producers.  However, this is not possible under incomplete information. 